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a b s t r a c t
We study finite horizon consumption and portfolio decisions of time-inconsistent individuals by incor-
porating the stochastic hyperbolic preferences of Harris and Laibson (2013) into the classical model of
Merton (1969, 1971) with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). We obtain closed-form solutions for
optimal consumption and portfolio choices for sophisticated individuals with log utility and numerical
solutions for those with power utility. Compared to the results of Merton, we find that stochastic hyper-
bolic discounting increases the consumption rate but has no effect on the share of wealth invested in the
risky asset.
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(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
Most economic decisions are intertemporal in nature and in-
volve tradeoffs between current and future rewards. The theory
of discounted utility has become the standard framework in eco-
nomics for analyzing intertemporal choices. An important ingredi-
ent of the theory is the discount function that discounts delayed
rewards to the present for decision making. The exponential dis-
count function with a constant discount rate has been the most
widely used discount function in the literature. According to Strotz
(1955), it is also the only discount function that leads to time-
consistent preferences, where an individual has no incentives to
deviate from an ex ante optimal plan in future times.
Overwhelming evidence has been documented in psychology
and behavioral science that time inconsistency is standard in hu-
man preferences (see e.g., Thaler and Shefrin, 1981; Ainslie and
Herrnstein, 1981; Ainslie and Haslam, 1992; Loewenstein and Pr-
elec, 1992; Kirby and Herrnstein, 1995; Myerson and Green, 1995;
McClure et al., 2004; DellaVigna andMalmendier, 2006). That is, in
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0/).pursuing immediate gratification, individuals often exhibit a rever-
sal of preferenceswhen choosing between a smaller, earlier reward
and an alternative larger, but later reward. The hyperbolic dis-
counting model has become the most widely accepted framework
for modeling time-inconsistent preferences in economics.1 Prelec
(2004) argues that ‘‘Few economic hypotheses have advanced so
rapidly from the fringe to the mainstream as hyperbolic discount-
ing’’. A huge literature has been developed to address a wide range
of issues in economics based on hyperbolic discounting, which
includes Barro (1999), O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), DellaVigna
andMalmendier (2004), Grenadier andWang (2007), and Palacios-
Huerta and Pérez-Kakabadse (2013), among others.
Individuals with time-inconsistent preferences are regarded as
naive or sophisticateddepending onwhether they realize that their
preferences will change in the future.2 Naive individuals assume
future selves will act in the interest of the current self and make
decisions without considering future selves’ true preferences.
1 Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) propose an alternative approach to model time-
consistent preferences by suggesting that temptation but not preference change
might be the cause of dynamic inconsistent behavior. Miao (2008) adopts the
Gul–Pesendorfer approach to solve the problem of optimal option exercise by
dynamic programming.
2 The distinction between naivety and sophistication, first proposed by Strotz
(1955), has been analyzed by Akerlof (1991) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999),
among others.
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is not time-consistent and cannot be implemented in practice. On
the other hand, sophisticated individuals choose a time-consistent
plan that is optimal even given the anticipated actions that will be
taken by future selves according to their changing preferences.
In this paper, we study the intertemporal consumption–savings
and portfolio-selection problem, a fundamental issue in modern
economics and finance, for sophisticated individuals with time-
inconsistent preferences and a finite lifetime. Since the seminal
works of Merton (1969, 1971), almost all existing studies on the
intertemporal consumption and portfolio problem assume expo-
nential discounting with constant discount rate and thus imply
time-consistent preferences. We extend the current literature by
incorporating the stochastic hyperbolic discounting model of Har-
ris and Laibson (2013) into Merton’s classical framework.
Our paper makes several important contributions to the
literature. First,wederive theHamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (hereafter
HJB) equation of optimal consumption and portfolio choices for
sophisticated individuals with finite investment horizon using the
dynamic programming approach of Karp (2007). Second,we obtain
closed-form solutions for the log utility function and numerical
solutions for the power utility function. Third, we study the impact
of stochastic hyperbolic discounting on the dynamic behaviors
of expected wealth and consumption and expected lifetime
discounted utility. Compared to the results of Merton, we find that
stochastic hyperbolic discounting increases the consumption rate
but has no effect on the share of wealth invested in the risky asset.
Our paper complements several recent studies on similar is-
sues in the literature. For example, Marín-Solano and Navas (2010)
study the consumption and portfolio rules when the discount
function is deterministic with a decreasing discount rate and ob-
tain closed-form solutions for naive and sophisticated individu-
als. Gong et al. (2007) and Palacios-Huerta and Pérez-Kakabadse
(2013) study the optimal consumption and portfolio rules for so-
phisticated individuals with infinite horizon and stochastic hyper-
bolic discounting. While their approach cannot be applied to the
finite horizon case, we can easily extend our analysis to obtain op-
timal solutions for the infinite horizon case.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 intro-
duces the basic model setup. Section 3 derives the HJB equation
for sophisticated individuals with stochastic hyperbolic discount-
ing. Section 4 considers two special cases of log and power utility.
Section 5 compares the dynamic behaviors of expected wealth and
consumption of individuals with instantaneous gratification and
exponential discounting. Section 6 develops numerical solutions
for power utility. Section 7 concludes and the Appendix provides
technical details.
2. Model setup
In this section, we introduce the basic modeling framework
of Merton’s consumption and portfolio problem. We also discuss
the stochastic hyperbolic discounting preferences of Harris and
Laibson (2013).
2.1. The consumption and portfolio problem
Consider an individual facing the intertemporal consumption
and portfolio problem of Merton (1969, 1971). Suppose the indi-
vidual’s wealthw(t) at any time t can be invested into two assets:
a risk free asset that pays a rate of return r with certainty, and a
risky asset whose price follows geometric Brownian motion:
dS (t)
S (t)
= µdt + σdzt , (1)
where µ and σ represent the mean and volatility of the asset re-
turn respectively, and zt is a standard Wiener process. FollowingMerton (1969, 1971), we assume a complete market with no bor-
rowing constraints.
At any time t , the individual needs to choose c (t), an instanta-
neous rate of consumption, and α (t), the share of wealth invested
in the risky asset. Assuming that the individual has no wage in-
come, then the change in the individual’s wealth during a small
time interval dt is equal to the difference between the investment
proceeds and consumption,
dw (t) = [α (t) (µ− r) w (t)+ rw (t)− c (t)] dt
+ σα (t) w (t) dzt , (2)
with the initial conditionw0.
The individual needs to choose a time-consistent consump-
tion and portfolio policy to maximize the following expected
discounted utility of consumption over a finite and an infinite plan-
ning horizon, respectively:
max
α(s),c(s)
E
 T
t
D (t, s) u(c (s))ds+ D (t, T ) F(T , w(T ))

, (3)
max
α(s),c(s)
E
 ∞
t
D (t, s) u(c (s))ds

, (4)
where u (c(s)) is the utility function, D (t, s) denotes the discount
function that discounts the utility of consumption at s to the
present time t , and F(T , w(T )) is the bequest function.
2.2. Stochastic hyperbolic discounting
To study the consumption and portfolio problem of an in-
dividual with time-inconsistent preferences, we incorporate the
stochastic hyperbolic discounting function of Harris and Laibson
(2013) into Merton’s framework. As in Harris and Laibson (2013),
the discount interval is divided into two subintervals: the present
interval and the future interval. Payoffs in the present interval are
discounted exponentially with a constant discount rate ρ, whereas
payoffs in the future interval are first discounted exponentially
with ρ and then further discounted by an additional factor β ,
where 0 < β ≤ 1. Thus the discount function D (t, s) can be ex-
pressed as
D (t, s) =

e−ρ(s−t), s ∈ [t, t + τ) ;
βe−ρ(s−t), s ∈ [t + τ ,∞) , (5)
where [t, t + τ) is the present interval and [t + τ ,∞) is the future
interval. The duration of present interval τ is stochastic and expo-
nentially distributed with parameter λ. The stochastic hyperbolic
discount function D (t, s) satisfies the assumption of stationarity,
i.e., D (t, t + s) = D(0, s). The expected duration of the present
interval is E [τ ] = 1
λ
. The smaller the λ, the larger the expected
duration of the present interval. When λ = 0, the duration of the
present interval is∞, which means that the discount function de-
generates to an exponential discount function with the constant
discount rate ρ. The parameter β (0 < β ≤ 1) reflects the de-
gree of the present bias of the preferences. The smaller the β , the
larger the present bias. When β = 1, there is no difference be-
tween the present and the future interval, which implies that the
discount function D (t, s) again degenerates to an exponential dis-
count function with the constant discount rate ρ.
The stochastic hyperbolic discount functionD (t, s) implies that
the individual’s preferences change over time. When the decision
time goes from t to t ′, t ′ > t , the marginal rate of substitution of
utility at s for s′ changes from D(0,s−t)D(0,s′−t) to
D(0,s−t ′)
D(0,s′−t ′) .
3 It is easy to see
3 When the decision point is t , the value of one utility received at the future time
s is D (t, s). The stochastic variable D (t, s) satisfies the assumption of stationarity.
Therefore, at time t , the marginal rate of substitution of utility at s for s′ is D(t,s)D(t,s′) =
D(0,s−t)
D(0,s′−t) .
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D(0,s′−t ′) except for β = 1 or λ = 0. Therefore, the
preference at t differs from that at t ′.
Interestingly, when λ → ∞, the expected duration of the
present interval becomes zero and the discount function becomes
D (t, s) =

1, s = t;
βe−ρ(s−t), s ∈ [t,∞) . (6)
The stochastic discount function becomes a deterministic jump
function with a jump at t and is denoted as instantaneous grati-
fication (IG) discounting.
3. The HJB equation for sophisticated individuals
To obtain a time-consistent policy, a sophisticated individ-
ual with time-inconsistent preferences must take into account
of her/his future selves’ preferences in her/his current decision-
making. Mathematically, to obtain an optimal and time-consistent
consumption and portfolio policy, the sophisticated individual
with stochastic hyperbolic discounting needs to solve the follow-
ing optimization problems for finite and infinite planning horizons,
respectively
max
α(s),c(s)
E
 t+τ
t
e−ρ(s−t)u(c(s))ds
+β
 T
t+τ
e−ρ(s−t)u(c(s))ds+ βe−ρ(T−t)F(T , w(T ))

, (7)
max
α(s),c(s)
E
 t+τ
t
e−ρ(s−t)u(c(s))ds+ β
 ∞
t+τ
e−ρ(s−t)u(c(s))ds

, (8)
subject to Eq. (2). We emphasize that the expectations in (7) and
(8) treat τ as an exponentially distributed random variable with
parameter λ. In this section, we first derive the HJB equation of the
finite horizon problem for the sophisticated individual and then
extend the analysis to obtain the HJB equation of the infinite hori-
zon problem.
3.1. The HJB equation of the finite horizon problem
Our analysis is based on the method of Karp (2007), which has
also been used by Marín-Solano and Navas (2009, 2010). Specifi-
cally, we convert the continuous time problem to a discrete time
one and solve it by backward induction. We first obtain future
selves’ optimal actions. Then by iteration and passing to the con-
tinuous time limit, we obtain the HJB equation of the finite horizon
problem for the sophisticated individual.
Define V (t, w(t)) as the value function of problems (2) and (7)
when the initial condition is (t, w(t)), namely,
V (t, w(t)) = max
α(s),c(s)
E
 t+τ
t
e−ρ(s−t)u(c(s))ds
+β
 T
t+τ
e−ρ(s−t)u(c (s))ds+ βe−ρ(T−t)F(T , w(T ))

. (9)
We divide the interval [0, T ] into n periods of equal length ε
(i.e., T = nε) and denote t = jε,w (jε) = wj, c (jε) = cj, α (jε) =
αj, V

jε,wj
 = Vj, F (T , w(T )) = Vn, for j = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n − 1.
Then Eq. (2) becomes
w (t + ε) = w (t)+ [α (t) (µ− r) w (t)+ rw (t)− c (t)] ε
+ σα (t) w (t) (z (t + ε)− z (t)) .
As T is the final time and the bequest F (T , w(T ))will be obtained
by the individual’s descendant, the value of Vn at time (n− 1) ε is
βe−ρεVn. Therefore, the objective of the self at (n− 1)ε will be
Vn−1 = max
αn−1,cn−1
E(n−1)ε,wn−1 [u (cn−1) ε + βe−ρεVn],
s.t. wn = wn−1 + f ((n− 1) ε, cn−1αn−1)ε + σwn−1(zn − zn−1),
where f (t, c(t), α (t)) = α (t) (µ− r) w (t)+ rw (t)− c (t).Let c∗n−1 = c∗n−1((n− 1) ε, wn−1) and α∗n−1 = α∗n−1((n− 1) ε,
wn−1) be the optimal solutions of the right hand side of the above
equation, we denote
u¯n−1((n− 1) ε, wn−1) = un−1((n− 1) ε, c∗n−1α∗n−1),
and the objective of the self at (n− 2)ε will be
Vn−2 = max
αn−2,cn−2
E(n−2)ε,wn−2 [u (cn−2) ε
+D (0, ε) u¯n−1ε + βe−2ρεVn].
Let c∗n−2 = c∗n−2((n− 2) ε, wn−2) and α∗n−2 = α∗n−2((n− 2) ε,
wn−2) be the optimal solutions of the right hand term of the above
equation, denote
u¯n−2((n− 2) ε, wn−2) = un−2((n− 2) ε, c∗n−2, α∗n−2).
Following similar analysis, we obtain

c∗n−1, α
∗
n−1

and
u¯j(jε,wj) = uj(jε, c∗j , α∗j ), j = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n− 1.
Therefore, the value function Vj satisfies
Vj = max
αj,cj
Ejε,wj

u(cj)ε +
n−j−1
i=1
D (0, iε) u¯j+iε
+βe−(n−j)ρεVn

. (10)
Vj+1 satisfies
Vj+1 = E(j+1)ε,wj+1

n−j−2
i=0
D (0, iε) u¯j+i+1ε + βe−(n−j−1)ρεVn

= E(j+1)ε,wj+1

n−j−1
i=1
D (0, (i− 1) ε) u¯j+iε
+βe−(n−j−1)ρεVn

. (11)
Multiplying Eq. (10) by eρε , we have
eρεVj = max
αj,cj
Ejε,wj

eρεu(cj)ε
+
n−j−1
i=1
eρεD (0, iε) u¯j+iε + βe−(n−j−1)ρεVn

. (12)
Because eρε = 1+ ρε+ o(ε) for small ε, Eq. (12) can be written as
(1+ ρε)Vj = max
αj,cj
Ejε,wj

(1+ ρε)u cj ε + n−j−1
i=1
D (0, iε) u¯j+iε
+βe−(n−j−1)ρεVn + o (ε)

. (13)
Subtracting Eq. (11) from Eq. (13) and dividing the result by ε, we
obtain
Vj − Vj+1
ε
+ ρVj = max
αj,cj
Ejε,wj

(1+ ρε)u cj
+
n−j−1
i=1
[eρεD (0, iε)− D (0, (i− 1) ε)] u¯j+i + o (ε)
ε

. (14)
Since the stochastic variableD (t, s) satisfies the stationarity as-
sumption, only the parameter λ and the length of the discount in-
terval s− t have an impact on D (t, s). Furthermore, only the initial
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D (0, iε) is independent of u¯j+i, which implies
Ejε,wj

n−j−1
i=1
(eρεD (0, iε)− D (0, (i− 1) ε)) u¯j+i

=
n−j−1
i=1

eρεE jε,wj [D (0, iε)]
− Ejε,wj [D (0, (i− 1) ε)]

Ejε,wj [u¯j+i]
=
n−j−1
i=1
[eρεd(iε)− d((i− 1)ε)] × Ejε,wj [u¯j+i],
where d (iε) = E [D (0, iε)] = (1− β) e−λiε + β e−ρiε .
Because eρε = 1 + ρε + o(ε), eρεd (iε) − d((i − 1)ε) =
−λ (1− β) e−(λ+ρ)iεε + o (ε), we have
n−j−1
i=1
[eρεd (iε)− d((i− 1)ε)] × Ejε,wj [u¯j+i]
=
n−j−1
i=1
−λ (1− β) e−(λ+ρ)iεε × Ejε,wj [u¯j+i] + o(ε). (15)
Furthermore, as t = jε and w(t + ε) = w(t) + f (t, c (t) ,
α (t))ε + σw(t)(z (t + ε)− z (t)), we obtain
E[V ((t + ε) , w(t + ε))− V (t, w(t))]
ε
=

Vt + Vwf + 12Vwwα
2 (t) σ 2w2

w(t),c(t),α(t)
. (16)
Combining Eqs. (15) and (16) with Eq. (14) and letting ε→ 0 (T =
nε), we obtain
ρV (t, w (t))− Vt + K(t, w (t))
= max
α(t),c(t)

u(c (t))+ Vwf + 12Vwwα
2 (t) σ 2w2 (t)

, (17)
where
K(t, w (t)) = λ (1− β) E
 T
t
e−(λ+ρ)(s−t)u(c∗ (s))ds

, (18)
and c∗ (s) satisfies Eq. (17).
Thus, the HJB equation of problem (7) subject to Eq. (2) for
the sophisticated individual is Eqs. (17)–(18) with the following
boundary condition
V (T , w(T )) = F(T , w(T )). (19)
If β = 1 or λ = 0 in Eq. (18), then K(t, w (t)) ≡ 0 and we
recover the usual HJB equation of Merton (1969). Otherwise,
K(t, w (t)) ≠ 0 and Eq. (18) becomes an integro-differential equa-
tion.
3.2. The HJB equation of the infinite horizon problem
We next develop the HJB equation of the infinite horizon prob-
lem for the sophisticated individual. Let {α∗ (s) c∗ (s)} represent
the time-consistent consumption and portfolio rules from time
t forward and let V (t, w (t)) represent the corresponding value
function, then we have
V (t, w (t))
= E
 t+τ
t
e−ρ(s−t)u(c∗ (s))ds+ β
 ∞
t+τ
e−ρ(s−t)u(c∗ (s))ds
= E
 τ
0
e−ρzu(c∗ (z + t))dz + β
 ∞
τ
e−ρzu(c∗ (z + t))dz

= E
 τ
0
e−ρsu(c∗ (s+ t))ds+ β
 ∞
τ
e−ρsu(c∗ (s+ t))ds

= E
 τ
0
e−ρsu(c∗ (s))ds+ β
 ∞
τ
e−ρsu(c∗ (s))ds

,
where the fourth equality is obtained by relabeling {α∗ (s+ t) ,
c∗ (s+ t)} as {α∗ (s) , c∗ (s)}. This is due to the fact that, with the
same initial wealth w and investment opportunity at 0 and t , the
wealth processes {wt,w(t+s)}s∈[0,∞) and {w0,w(s)}s∈[0,∞) have the
same distribution. Therefore, the value function V is independent
of time t and depends only on the initial condition w(t). Thus,
write V (t, w (t)) = V (w) to reflect this independence. Substitut-
ing V (w) and dropping all t subscripts, we rewrite Eqs. (17) and
(18) as,
ρV (w)+ K (w) = max
α,c

u (c)+ Vwf + 12Vwwα
2σ 2w2

, (20)
where
K (w) = λ (1− β) E
 ∞
0
e−(λ+ρ)su(c∗ (s))ds

, (21)
and c∗ (s) satisfies Eq. (20).
Further assume limT→∞ βe−ρ(T−t)F(T , w(T )) = 0.4 The boun-
dary condition Eq. (19) becomes to the below transversality condi-
tion5
lim
T→∞ E
{exp (−ρt) V (w (t))} = 0. (22)
Therefore, the HJB of problem of (8) subjects to Eq. (2) for the
sophisticated individual is Eqs. (20)–(21) with the transversality
condition Eq. (22).
Interestingly, Palacios-Huerta and Pérez-Kakabadse (2013) ob-
tain the same HJB equation for the infinite horizon problem using
a different method. Specifically, they define
V (wt) = max
α,c
Et
 t+τ
t
e−ρ(s−t)u(c (s))ds+ βe−ρτ J(wt+τ )

,
where
J(wξ ) =
 ∞
ξ
e−ρ(s−ξ)u(c˜ (s))ds,
and c˜ (s) stands for the consumption levels optimally chosen by
future selves. They obtain the HJB equation below
ρV (w)− λ [βV (w)− J (w)]
= max
α,c

u (c)+ Vwf + 12Vwwα
2σ 2w2

,
where
−λ [βV (w)− J (w)] = K (w)
= λ (1− β) E
 ∞
0
e−(λ+ρ)su(c∗ (s))ds

,
which is consistent with our results. While we can derive the HJB
equation for the infinite horizon problem from our method, we
cannot use the method of Palacios-Huerta and Pérez-Kakabadse
(2013) to derive the HJB equation for the finite horizon problem.
4 limT→∞ βe−ρ(T−t)F (T , w (T )) = 0 is a condition for convergence of the
integral in Eq. (7).
5 Readers are referred to Merton (1969) for detailed discussion of the transver-
sality condition.
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In this section, we consider two special cases of the general
CRRA family: log and power utility. For each case, we obtain the
finite-horizon time-consistent consumption and portfolio rules
and study the impact of hyperbolic discounting on consumption
and portfolio decisions. Our analysis can be easily extended to the
case of infinite horizon.
4.1. The case of log utility
For u (c) = ln c , we conjecture that the value function V (t,
w(t)) has the following representation
V (t, w(t)) = A (t) lnw(t)+ B(t),
whereV (T , w(T )) = F(T , w(T )). FollowingMerton (1969),we as-
sume F(T , w(T )) = ζ lnw(T ). Given the expression of V (t, w(t)),
we easily get
Vt = A′ (t) lnw + B′ (t) , Vw = A (t)
w
,
Vww = −A (t)
w2
, A (T ) = ζ , B (T ) = 0.
Thus, from Eq. (17), we obtain
c∗ (t) = w(t)
A(t)
, α∗ (t) = −Vw(µ− r)
Vwwwσ 2
= µ− r
σ 2
, (23)
and the time-consistent state trajectory becomes
dw (t) =

(µ− r)2
σ 2
+ r − 1
A (t)

w (t) dt + µ− r
σ
w (t) dzt . (24)
Incorporating Eq. (23) into Eq. (18), we obtain
K(t, w (t)) = λ (1− β) E
 T
t
e−(λ+ρ)(s−t)u(c∗ (s))ds

= λ (1− β) E
 T
t
e−(λ+ρ)(s−t)(lnw (s)− ln A (s))ds

. (25)
From Eq. (24), we have
d lnw (s) =

(µ− r)2
2σ 2
+ r − 1
A (s)

ds+ µ− r
σ
dzs, (26)
which implies
E [d lnw (s)] =

(µ− r)2
2σ 2
+ r − 1
A (s)

ds (27)
and
E [lnw (s)] = lnw (t)+
 s
t

(µ− r)2
2σ 2
+ r − 1
A (x)

dx. (28)
Incorporating Eq. (28) into Eq. (25), K(t, w (t)) can be expressed as
K(t, w (t)) = λ (1− β)

lnw (t)
 T
t
e−(λ+ρ)(s−t)ds
+
 T
t
e−(λ+ρ)(s−t)
 s
t

(µ− r)2
2σ 2
+ r − 1
A (x)

dxds
−
 T
t
e−(λ+ρ)(s−t) ln A (s) ds

. (29)Incorporating Eqs. (23) and (29) into Eq. (17), we obtain
ρ(A (t) lnw (t)+ B (t))+ λ (1− β)

lnw (t)
 T
t
e−(λ+ρ)(s−t)ds
+
 T
t
e−(λ+ρ)(s−t) ×
 s
t

(µ− r)2
2σ 2
+ r − 1
A (x)

dx

ds
−
 T
t
e−(λ+ρ)(s−t) ln A (s) ds

− A′(t) lnw(t)+ B′(t)
= lnw (t)− ln A (t)+

(µ− r)2
2σ 2
+ r − 1
A (t)

A (t) . (30)
As Eq. (30) must be satisfied for every t and w (t) , A (t)must sat-
isfy the following ordinary differential equation:
ρA (t)+ λ (1− β)
 T
t
e−(λ+ρ)(s−t)ds = A′ (t)+ 1,
A (T ) = ζ .
(31)
We solve Eq. (31) and obtain
A (t) =

ζ − β
ρ

e−ρ(T−t) − 1− β
λ+ ρ e
−(λ+ρ)(T−t) + λβ + ρ
ρ(λ+ ρ) . (32)
From Eqs. (23) and (32), we obtain the time-consistent consump-
tion rate
c∗ (t)
w(t)
= ρ(λ+ ρ)
(ρ (λ+ ρ) ζ − β (λ+ ρ))e−ρ(T−t) − ρ (1− β) e−(λ+ρ)(T−t) + λβ + ρ . (33)
Appendix A shows that the consumption rate c
∗(t)
w(t) increases (de-
creases) with λ (β).
For λ = 0 or β = 1, the problem reduces to the classical case of
Merton and
c∗ (t)
w(t)
= c
∗ (t)
w(t)

M
= ρ
1+ (ρζ − 1) e−ρ(T−t) ,
where the subscript ‘M ’ stands forMerton’s case. Forλ > 0 and0 <
β < 1,we have the solution for the stochastic hyperbolic discount-
ing case and c
∗(t)
w(t) = c
∗(t)
w(t) |S (the subscript ‘S’ stands for the stochas-
tic hyperbolic discounting case). Appendix A shows that c
∗(t)
w(t) |s >
c∗(t)
w(t) |M for t ∈ [0, T ). The above analysis leads to the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. If λ > 0, 0 < β < 1, and T <∞, the consumption
and portfolio rules of a sophisticated individual with log utility satisfy
c∗ (t)
w(t)

s
= ρ(λ+ ρ)
(ρ (λ+ ρ) ζ − β (λ+ ρ))e−ρ(T−t) − ρ (1− β) e−(λ+ρ)(T−t) + λβ + ρ
α∗S =
µ− r
σ 2
.
Furthermore for all t ∈ [0, T )
c∗ (t)
w(t)

S
>
c∗ (t)
w(t)

M
, α∗S (t) = α∗M (t)
and the consumption rate c
∗(t)
w(t) |S increases (decreases) with λ (β).
For the IG discounting case (i.e., λ→∞), the consumption rate
c∗(t)
w(t) |s reduces to
c∗ (t)
w(t)

I
= ρ
(ρζ − β) e−ρ(T−t) + β , (34)
where the subscript ‘I ’ represents the IG discounting case. This
leads to the following corollary.
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Corollary 1. If T <∞, letting λ→∞, we have
c∗ (t)
w(t)

I
= ρ
(ρζ − β) e−ρ(T−t) + β .
Furthermore
c∗ (t)
w(t)

I
>
c∗ (t)
w(t)

M
, α∗S (t) = α∗M (t)
and the consumption rate c
∗(t)
w(t) |I decreases with β .
Let T → ∞, our solutions for the finite horizon case reduce
to that of the infinite horizon case of Palacios-Huerta and Pérez-
Kakabadse (2013) (see Eq. (18) and footnote (21) of Palacios-
Huerta and Pérez-Kakabadse (2013)). That is,
c∗ (t)
w(t)

T→∞,S
= ρ(λ+ ρ)
λβ + ρ and
c∗ (t)
w(t)

T→∞,I
= ρ
β
. (35)
Therefore, for an infinite planning horizon, the solution for the case
of stochastic hyperbolic and IG discounting can be obtained by
replacing ρ in the solution for the exponential discounting case
by a higher constant discount rate ρ(λ+ρ)
λβ+ρ and
ρ
β
, respectively.6
However, this result cannot be generalized to the case of the finite
planning horizon, thus highlighting the importance of our results.
We illustrate the impact of various model parameters on c
∗(t)
w(t) |S
and c
∗(t)
w(t) |I .Without loss of generality, we chooseρ = 0.046, T = 4
and ζ = 1, where ζ = 1 means the bequest obtained by the de-
scendent is not taxed. From Fig. 1, which plots c
∗(t)
w(t) |S for different
levels of β, λ and t , we see that c
∗(t)
w(t) |S increases with λ and de-
creases with β and T − t .
Fig. 2, which plots the consumption rate of the IG discounting
case at different levels ofβ , shows that c
∗(t)
w(t) |S decreaseswithβ and
T − t .
Collectively, Figs. 1 and 2 show that a sophisticated individual
with either stochastic hyperbolic or IG discounting will consume
a higher proportion of his/her wealth if he/she has a stronger
present-biased preference and is closer to the end of the planning
horizon.
4.2. The case of power utility
For u (c) = c1−b1−b , where b > 0 and b ≠ 1, we conjecture that
the value function V (t, w(t)) can be expressed as V (t, w(t)) =
h (t) (w(t))
1−b
1−b , where V (t, w(t)) satisfies the boundary condition
6 In an exponential discounting case, the effective discount rate is ρ.Fig. 2. The impact of β and t on the consumption rate c
∗(t)
w(t) |I .
V (T , w(T )) = F(T , w(T )). Following Merton (1969), we assume
F(T , w(T )) = ζ b (w(T ))1−b1−b . Given the expression of V (t, w(t)), we
easily get
Vt = h′ (t) (w(t))
1−b
1− b , Vw = h (t) (w(t))
−b,
Vww = −bh (t) (w (t))−1−b , h (T ) = ζ b.
Therefore, from Eq. (17), we have
c∗ (t) = (h (t))−1b w (t) ,
α∗ (t) = −Vw (µ− r)
Vwwwσ 2
= µ− r
bσ 2
,
(36)
and the time-consistent state trajectory becomes
dw (t) =

(µ− r)2
σ 2
+ r − (h (t))−1b

w (t) dt
+ µ− r
bσ
w (t) dzt . (37)
Incorporating Eq. (36) into Eq. (18), we obtain
K(t, w (t))
= λ (1− β) E
 T
t
e−(λ+ρ)(s−t)
(h (s))−
1−b
b (w (s))1−b
1− b ds

. (38)
From Eq. (37), we have
d(w (s))1−b = (1− b) (w (s))1−b

(µ− r)2
2bσ 2
+ r
− (h (s))− 1b

ds+ µ− r
bσ
dz

. (39)
Therefore,
E

(w (s))1−b
 = (w (t))1−b exp (1− b)  s
t

(µ− r)2
2bσ 2
+ r − (h (x))− 1b

dx

. (40)
Incorporating Eq. (40) into Eq. (38), K(t, w (t)) can be expressed as
K(t, w (t)) = λ (1− β) (w (t))
1−b
1− b E
 T
t
e−(λ+ρ)(s−t)(h (s))−
1−b
b
× exp

(1− b)
 s
t

(µ− r)2
2bσ 2
+ r − (h (x))− 1b

dx

ds

. (41)
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h′(t) =

ρ − (1− b)

(µ− r)2
2bσ 2
+ r

h (t)− b(h (t))1− 1b
+ λ (1− β)
 T
t
e−(λ+ρ)(s−t) (h (s))1−
1
b
× exp

(1− b)
 s
t

(µ− r)2
2bσ 2
+ r − (h (x))− 1b

dx

ds, (42)
where h (T ) = ζ b. If b = 1, the above solution reduces to that of
the log utility case.
If λ > 0, 0 < β < 1 and T →∞, the consumption rate c∗(t)
w(t) |S= v∗, a constant that equals
v∗ = 1
b

ρ + λ (1− β) v
∗
(λ+ ρ)− (1− b)

µ¯− b σ¯ 22 − v∗

− (1− b) µ¯− b σ¯
2
2

, (43)
where µ¯ = α∗µ + (1− α∗) r = (µ−r)2bσ 2 + r and σ¯ 2 = (α∗)2σ 2 =
(µ−r)2
b2
are the mean and the variance of the return of the time-
consistent portfolio.7 Readers are referred to Palacios-Huerta and
Pérez-Kakabadse (2013) for the derivation of Eq. (43). Appendix B
shows that v∗ increases (decreases) with λ (β).
If λ > 0, 0 < β < 1, T < ∞ and b ≠ 1, Eq. (42) becomes
a highly non-linear integro-differential equation, which makes it
difficult to obtain analytical solutions of h(t) and consequently
c∗(t)
w(t) |S . In Section 6,wedevelop a numerical scheme for the solution
of Eq. (42), which yields the numerical solutions of h(t) and c
∗(t)
w(t) |S .
5. Comparative dynamic behavior
The above analysis shows that stochastic hyperbolic discount-
ing affects only the consumption but not the portfolio decisions of
sophisticated individuals. In this section, we further compare the
dynamic behaviors of expected wealth E [w (t)] and consumption
E[c(t)] under exponential discounting and IG discounting for log
utility with zero bequest. IG discounting represents the strongest
present-biased preferences, and log utility greatly simplifies the
analysis by allowing analytical solutions.
For the exponential discounting case with log utility, the aver-
age budget equation is
w¯(t)
w(t)

M
= µ¯− zM (t) = µ¯− ρ1− eρ(t−T ) , (44)
where w¯(t) denotes the expected growth rate of wealth, w¯ (t) =
E[dw]
dt , and zM (t) = ρ1−eρ(t−T ) denotes the instantaneous marginal
propensity to consume out ofwealth, and µ¯ = α∗µ+(1− α∗) r =
(µ−r)2
σ 2
+ r . Differentiating Eq. (44), we obtain
d
dt

w¯ (t)
w (t)

M

= − ρ
2
(1− eρ(t−T ))2 . (45)
7 Note that, the time-consistent policy α∗ = 1b µ−rσ 2 given in (36) implies that
µ¯− b σ¯ 22 = r + 12b (µ−r)
2
σ 2
> 0.For the IG discounting case with log utility, the average budget
equation under the time-consistent policy is
w¯(t)
w(t)

I
= µ¯− zI (t) = µ¯− ρ
β(1− eρ(t−T )) , (46)
where zI (t) = ρβ(1−eρ(t−T )) . Differentiating Eq. (46), we obtain
d
dt

w¯ (t)
w (t)

I

= − ρ
2
β

1− eρ(t−T )2 . (47)
Eqs. (45) and (47) show that in both cases the expected growth
rate of wealth is a decreasing function of time. However, the ex-
pected growth rate of wealth is higher under IG discounting than
exponential discounting
d
dt

w¯ (t)
w (t)

I

>
d
dt

w¯ (t)
w (t)

M

.
Under exponential discounting, if µ¯ < zM (0) = ρ1−e−ρT , the in-
dividual will disinvest (i.e., consume more than expected income,
µ¯w(t)). If µ¯ > zM (0) = ρ1−e−ρT , the individual will plan to in-
crease his/her wealth for 0 < t < tM and disinvest for tM < t < T ,
where tM equals
tM = T + 1
ρ
log

µ¯− ρ
µ¯

. (48)
Under IG discounting, if µ¯ < zI (0) = ρβ(1−e−ρT ) , the individual
will disinvest. If µ¯ > ρ
β(1−e−ρT ) , the individual will plan to increase
his/her wealth for 0 < t < tI , and then disinvest for tI < t < T ,
where tI is defined as
tI = T + 1
ρ
log

βµ¯− ρ
βµ¯

. (49)
It is evident that tM > tI , which implies that with the same
initial wealth, the individual is a net saver for a longer period of
time under exponential discounting than IG discounting. At the
same time, ∂tI
∂β
> 0 implies that the individualwill be a net saver for
a longer period of time as β increases (present-biased preferences
decrease).
The expected growth rate of wealth depends on the expected
return of the optimal portfolio and the instantaneous marginal
propensity of consumption. Since present-biased preferences have
no effects on optimal portfolio decisions, the expected portfolio re-
turn µ¯ should be the sameunder both exponential and IGdiscount-
ing. On the other hand, the instantaneous marginal propensity to
consume is greater under IG discounting, i.e., zM (t) = ρ1−eρ(t−T ) <
zI (t) = ρβ(1−eρ(t−T )) . As a result, the dynamic behavior of w(t) will
be different under IG and exponential discounting.
Under both cases, the individual will choose to (i) disinvest un-
til T if µ¯ < zM (0); and (ii) first increase his/her wealth and then
disinvest if µ¯ > zI (0). On the other hand, if zM (0) < µ¯ < zI (0),
the individual will choose to (i) disinvest until Tunder IG discount-
ing; and (ii) first increase his/her wealth until time tM and then
disinvest until T under exponential discounting. The above analy-
sis leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 2. If T < ∞, for a sophisticated individual with log
utility and zero bequest, we have:
(1) If µ¯ < zM (0), the individual will plan to disinvest under both IG
and exponential discounting, but with a higher expected growth
rate of wealth under IG discounting;
(2) If µ¯ > zI (0), the individual will plan to increase wealth before
disinvest under both IG and exponential discounting, but with a
longer period of increasing wealth under exponential discounting;
(3) If zM (0) < µ¯ < zI (0), the individualwill plan to increase his/her
wealth until tM and then disinvest until T under exponential
discounting,while under IG discounting, the individualwill choose
to disinvest until T .
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Next we study the dynamic behavior of expected consump-
tion under IG and exponential discounting. Under exponential
discounting, given initial wealth w(t), the expected wealth and
consumption under the optimal policy at s are, respectively,
E [w (s)] |M = eγ (s−t) 1− e
ρ(s−T )
eρ(s−t) − eρ(s−T )w (t) , (50)
E [c (s)] |M = ρe
γ (s−t)
eρ(s−t) − eρ(s−T )w (t) , (51)
where s ∈ [t, T ] and γ = (µ−r)2
2σ 2
+ r .
Under IG discounting, given initial wealth w(t), the expected
wealth and consumption under the time-consistent policy at s are,
respectively,
E [w (s)] |I = eγ (s−t)

1− eρ(s−T )
eρ(s−t) − eρ(s−T )
 1
β
w (t) , (52)
E [c (s)] |I = ρ
β

1− eρ(s−T ) eγ (s−t)
×

1− eρ(s−T )
eρ(s−t) − eρ(s−T )
 1
β
w (t) , (53)
where s ∈ [t, T ].
Given the same initial wealth, an individual with IG discounting
would have smaller expected wealth than the one with exponen-
tial discounting because
E [w (s)] |I
E [w (s)] |M =

1− eρ(s−T )
eρ(s−t) − eρ(s−T )
 1
β
−1
< 1.
From Eqs. (51) and (53), we obtain the following ratio of expected
future consumption of the two discounting cases:
E [c (s)] |I
E [c (s)] |M =
1
β

1− eρ(s−T )
eρ(s−t) − eρ(s−T )
 1
β
−1
. (54)
Appendix C shows that there exists a t∗ such that
E [c (s)] |I
E [c (s)] |M > 1, s ∈

t, t∗
 ;
E [c (s)] |I
E [c (s)] |M < 1, s ∈

t∗, T

.
(55)
Therefore, an individual with IG discounting would choose to con-
sumemore (less) in earlier (later) stage of life than one with expo-
nential discounting.
If 0 < β1 < β2 < 1, then
E [c (s)] |I,β1
E [c (s)] |I,β2
= β2
β1

1− eρ(s−T )
eρ(s−t) − eρ(s−T )
 β2−β1
β1β2
.Similar analysis in Appendix C shows that there exists a t∗∗ such
that
E [c (s)] |I,β1
E [c (s)] |I,β2
> 1, s ∈ t, t∗∗ ;
E [c (s)] |I
E [c (s)] |M < 1, s ∈

t∗∗, T

.
(56)
Therefore, an individual with greater present-biased preferences
would choose to consumemore (less) in earlier (later) stage of life.
The above analysis leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 3. If T <∞, for a sophisticated individualwith log util-
ity and zero bequest, we have:
(1) An individual with IG discounting would choose to consume more
(less) in earlier (later) stage of life than one with exponential dis-
counting;
(2) An individual with greater present-biased preferences would
choose to consume more (less) in earlier (later) stage of life.
Fig. 3, which plots E [c (s)] |I (β = 0.5 and β = 0.8) and
E [c (s)] |M (ρ = r = 0.046, T = 4, ζ = 0, w(0) = 1), illustrates
the second main point of Proposition 3.
6. Numerical results
Though we obtain analytical solutions of the time-consistent
consumption and portfolio rules for log utility, it is generally dif-
ficult to solve the non-linear integro-differential HJB equation
for other utility functions. In this section, following Ekland et al.
(2012), we develop a numerical scheme to solve Eq. (42), the non-
linear integro-differential HJB equation for the power utility func-
tion, to obtain the numerical consumption rate c
∗(t)
w(t) |S .Without loss
of generality, we choose ζ = 1 though the method can be equally
applied to other values of ζ .
Let a = ρ − (1− b) ( (µ−r)2
2bσ 2
+ r), then Eq. (42) becomes
h′ (t) = ah (t)− b(h (t))1− 1b
+ λ (1− β)
 T
t
e−(λ−a)(s−t)(h (s))1−
1
b
H (s)
H (t)
ds, (57)
where H (s) = exp[−  Ts (1− b) (h (x))− 1b dx] and consequently
H ′ (s) = (1− b) (h (s))− 1b H (s).
We discretize the interval [0, T ] into N subintervals by intro-
ducing N points, tn = T + n∆, where∆ = − TN , n = 0, 1, . . . ,N −
1,N . We solve Eq. (57) numerically in three steps.
First, we construct the sequences h1n and H
1
n , for n = 0, 1, . . . ,
N − 1,N ,
h1n+1 = h1n +∆h′ (tn) , h10 = 1;
H1n+1 = H1n +∆H ′ (tn) , H10 = 1,
and
h1n+1 = (1+ a∆) h1n − b∆(h1n)1−
1
b
+ λ (1− β)
 T
tn
e−(λ−a)(s−t)(h (s))1−
1
b
H (s)
H (tn)
ds,
H1n+1 = H1n − (1− b)∆(h (tn))−
1
b H1n .
The sequences h1n and H
1
n satisfy Lemma 1 below.
Lemma 1. There exists a constant C such thath1n − h (tn) ≤ C |∆| ,H1n − H (tn) ≤ C |∆| for n = 0, 1, . . . ,N − 1,N.
Second, we discretize the integral
λ (1− β)
 T
tn
e−(λ−a)(s−t) (h (s))1−
1
b
H (s)
H (tn)
ds
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2
n , for n = 0, 1, . . . ,N−1,N ,
where h20 = 1,H20 = 1 and
h2n+1 = (1+ a∆) h2n − b∆(h2n)1−
1
b
− λ (1− β)∆2
n−1
j=0
e−(λ−a)(tj−tn)(h(tj))1−
1
b
H2j
H2n
,
H2n+1 = H2n − (1− b)∆(h2n)−
1
b H2n .
The sequences h2n and H
2
n satisfy Lemma 2 below.
Lemma 2. There exists a constant C such thath2n − h1n ≤ C |∆| ,H2n − H1n  ≤ C |∆| , for n = 0, 1, . . . ,N − 1,N.
Finally, we introduce an explicit scheme by constructing the
sequences h3n and H
3
n , for n = 0, 1, . . . ,N − 1,N , where h3n and
H3n satisfy h
3
0 = 1 and H30 = 1 and
h3n+1 = (1+ a∆) h3n − b∆(h3n)1−
1
b
− λ (1− β)∆2
n−1
j=0
e−(λ−a)(tj−tn)(h3j )
1− 1b
H3j
H3n
,
H3n+1 = H3n − (1− b)∆(h3n)−
1
b H3n .
The sequences h3n and H
3
n satisfy Lemma 3 below.
Lemma 3. There exists a constant C such thath3n − h2n ≤ C |∆| ,H3n − H2n  ≤ C |∆| , for n = 0, 1, . . . ,N − 1,N.
Theproofs of Lemmas1–3 are similar to that shown inAppendix
F–H of Ekland et al. (2012).
By using the preceding lemmas and the Lipschitz continuity of
function h(t), we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Letting hN (t) be the function obtained by the linear in-
terpolation of the points (tn = T − nTN ), then there exists a constant
C such that
|hN (t)− h(t)| ≤ C |∆| , t ∈ [0, T ] .
Theorem 1 implies that, when the length of interval segmenta-
tion |∆| goes to 0, hN (t) is approximately equal to h (t).
By analysis of h3n and H
3
n , n = 0, 1, . . . ,N − 1,N, hN (t) has the
following property.
Corollary 2. hN (t) decreases (increases) with λ (β).
Appendix D shows the proof of Corollary 2.
Because hN (t) is the numerical solution of Eq. (42), Corollary 2
implies that h (t) decreases (increases) with λ (β). From Eq. (36),
∂ c
∗(t)
w(t)
∂β
= −1
b
(h (t))−1−
1
b
∂h (t)
∂β
< 0, (58)
and
∂ c
∗(t)
w(t)
∂λ
= −1
b
(h (t))−1−
1
b
∂h (t)
∂λ
> 0. (59)
Eqs. (58) and (59) imply that the greater the present-biased
preferences (the smaller β) or the smaller the duration of the
present interval (the larger the hazard rate λ), the higher the con-
sumption rate c
∗(t)
w(t) |S . The above analysis leads to the following
proposition.Proposition 4. If λ > 0, 0 < β < 1, T <∞ and b ≠ 1, then
c∗ (t)
w(t)

S
>
c∗ (t)
w(t)

M
, α∗s (t) = α∗M (t) .
Furthermore, the greater the present-biased preferences (the smaller
β) or the shorter the expected length of the present interval (the larger
λ), the higher the consumption rate c
∗(t)
w(t) |S .
Propositions 1 and 4 indicate that, when T <∞, the consump-
tion rate (i) is larger under stochastic hyperbolic discounting than
exponential discounting and (ii) increases (decreases) with λ (β)
for both log and power utility. When T → ∞, c∗(t)
w(t) |S = v∗λ<∞
and c
∗(t)
w(t) |I = v∗λ→∞: for both log and power utility, the constant
consumption rate v∗λ<∞ increases (decreases) with λ (β) and the
constant consumption rate v∗λ→∞ decreases with β .
Below we provide numerical analysis on the impact of λ and
β on the consumption rate based on the following parameters:
the risk-free interest rate r = 0.046, the aggregate risk premium
µ−r = 0.06, the annual volatility of themarket portfolio σ = 0.2,
the coefficient of relative risk aversion b = 2, ρ = r,N = 1000,
and T = 4.
Fig. 4 plots the consumption rate c
∗(t)
w(t) |S for different β and fi-
nite λ. From Fig. 4, we see that the greater the present-biased pref-
erences (the smaller β), the higher the consumption rate c
∗(t)
w(t) |S .
Fig. 5 plots the consumption rate c
∗(t)
w(t) |S for different λ and
constantβ . From Fig. 5, we see that the smaller the expected length
of the present interval (the larger λ), the higher the consumption
rate c
∗(t)
w(t) |S .
Next we study the impact of hyperbolic discounting on the
expected lifetime discounted utility for finite and infinite planning
horizons. From Section 4.2, we have V (t, w (t)) = h (t) (w(t))1−b1−b ,
so
∂V
∂β
= ∂h (t)
∂β
(w(t))1−b
1− b .
From Corollary 2, when b > 1, ∂V
∂β
< 0 and when b < 1, ∂V
∂β
>
0. Therefore, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 5. If λ > 0, T <∞, then
(1) V (t, w (t))|S < V (t, w (t))|M for 0 < b < 1;
(2) V (t, w (t))|S > V (t, w (t))|M for b > 1.
If T →∞, then
V (w, λ, β) = (v∗)−b w
1−b
1− b
where v∗satisfies Eq. (43). So,
∂V
∂β
= −b(v∗)−1−b ∂v
∗
∂β
(w)1−b
1− b .
Appendix C shows that v∗ increases (decreases) with λ (β).
Therefore, ∂V
∂β
< 0 for b > 1, ∂V
∂β
> 0 for b < 1, we obtain the
following proposition.
Proposition 6. If λ > 0, T →∞, then
(1) V (t, w (t))|S ≤ V (t, w (t))|M for 0 < b < 1;
(2) V (t, w (t))|S ≥ V (t, w (t))|M for b > 1.
Propositions 5 and 6 show that present-biased preferences have
different impacts on the expected lifetime discounted utility for
different levels of relative risk aversion b. If the coefficient of
relative risk aversion b < 1, then the individual’s expected lifetime
discounted utility increases with β . However, when the coefficient
of relative risk aversion b > 1, present-biased preferences have
a positive effect on the individual’s expected lifetime discounted
utility, which decreases with β .
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Fig. 5. The impact of λ on the consumption rate.
7. Conclusion
This paper extends the consumption–savings and portfolio-
selection problem of Merton’s (1969, 1971) classical model to ac-
count for time-inconsistent preferences. Sophisticated individuals
need to formulate their time-consistent consumption and portfo-
lio plan by taking into account their future selves’ changing prefer-
ences. Using a recursive method, we obtain the HJB equations for
infinite and finite planning horizons. We obtain closed-form solu-
tions for consumption and portfolio rules for log utility and numer-
ical solutions for power utility. Compared to the results of Merton,
we find that stochastic hyperbolic discounting increases the con-
sumption rate but has no effect on the share of wealth invested in
the risky asset.
Three possible extensions of the model could be interesting.
First, we could study the intermediate case between perfectly
naive and sophisticated individuals. While the sophisticated in-
dividual is fully aware of the true action of his future selves and
makes time-consistent plans accordingly, the partially sophisti-
cated individual of O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) is more rational.
Second, our model could be extended to account for incomplete
markets and variousmarket frictions (e.g., taxes, transaction costs).
Finally, as our model assumes finite and infinite horizons, the
model could be extended to account for uncertain lifetime of the
individual.
Appendix A
Defining
g (t, β, λ) = ρ (λ+ ρ)
(ρ (λ+ ρ) ζ − β (λ+ ρ)) e−ρ(T−t) − ρ (1− β) e−(λ+ρ)(T−t) + λβ + ρ ,
then
∂g(t, β, λ)
∂β
= ρ (λ+ ρ) [(λ+ ρ) e
−ρ(T−t) − ρe−(λ+ρ)(T−t) − λ]
[(ρ (λ+ ρ) ζ − β (λ+ ρ)) e−ρ(T−t) − ρ (1− β) e−(λ+ρ)(T−t) + λβ + ρ]2 ,
∂g(t, β, λ)
∂λ
= −ρ
2 (1− β) (1+ (λ+ ρ) (T − t)) e−ρ(T−t) + ρ2 (1− β)
[(ρ (λ+ ρ) ζ − β (λ+ ρ)) e−ρ(T−t) − ρ (1− β) e−(λ+ρ)(T−t) + λβ + ρ]2 .Defining k (t) = (λ+ ρ) e−ρ(T−t)− ρe−(λ+ρ)(T−t)− λ, it is evident
that k′ (t) = ρ (λ+ ρ) e−ρ(T−t) 1− e−λ(T−t) > 0 for t ∈ [0, T )
and k′ (T ) = 0, which means maxt∈[0,T ] k (t) = k (T ) = 0.
Therefore, k (t) < 0 for t ∈ [0, T ), which implies ∂g(t,β,λ)
∂β
< 0.
Then, the consumption rate decreases with β .
Similarly, ∂g(t,β,λ)
∂λ
> 0 and the consumption rate increases
with λ.
Appendix B
Let a = ρ− (1− b) ( (µ−r)2
2bσ 2
+ r). From Eq. (43), λ = 0 or β = 1
represents the exponential discounting case, and v∗ = vM = ab .
We denote
F (x) = bx− a+ λ(1− β)x
(b− 1) x− a+λb−1  .
We want to find the roots of F (x) when b < 1 and b > 1. As
F (x)mayhavemore than one root, we choose the smallest positive
root as our root.
(1) The roots of F (x) for b > 1.
It is evident that
F ′ (x) = b− λ (1− β) (a+ λ)[(b− 1) x− (a+ λ)]2 .
When F ′(x) = 0, we find that the roots of F ′(x) are
x1 = a+ λb− 1 −
1
b− 1

λ(1− β)(a+ λ)
b
,
x2 = a+ λb− 1 +
1
b− 1

λ(1− β)(a+ λ)
b
,
where x1 and x2 satisfy
a
b
< x1 <
a+ λ
b− 1 , x1 < x2.
We use the feasibility condition of b > 1 − β in Palacios-Huerta
and Pérez-Kakabadse (2013) for the deduction of x1 > ab . Thus,
F (x) increases in ( ab , x1) and (x2,∞) anddecreases in (x1, a+λb−1 ) and
( a+λb−1 , x2).
We first consider the roots of F (x) in ( a+λb−1 ,∞). As F (x) in-
creases in(x2,∞) and decreases in ( a+λb−1 , x2), theminimum of F (x)
in ( a+λb−1 ,∞) is F (x2), and
F (x2) = 1b− 1

(bλ+ a)+λ (1− β) b (a+ λ)
+ λ (1− β)

(bλ+ a)+√λ (1− β) b (a+ λ)√
λ (1− β) b (a+ λ)

> 0.
Therefore, F (x) > 0 for x ∈ ( a+λb−1 ,∞) and F (x) has no root in
( a+λb−1 ,∞).
Second, we consider the roots of F (x) in ( ab ,
a+λ
b−1 ). As F (x) de-
creases in (x1, a+λb−1 ) and increases in (
a
b , x1), the maximum of F (x)
in ( ab ,
a+λ
b−1 ) is F (x1), where
F (x1) = 1b− 1
√
bλ+ a−λ (1− β)2 .
As bλ + a > λ (1− β) , F (x1) > 0. From the expression of F (x),
we have F
 a
b
 = −λ(1−β)abλ+a < 0 and limx→ a+λ−b−1 F (x) = −∞.
Thus, there exist x∗3 and x
∗
4, x
∗
3 ∈ ( ab , x1), x∗4 ∈ (x1, a+λb−1 ) such that
F

x∗3
 = F x∗4 = 0. As x∗3 < x∗4 , we choose x∗3 as our root.
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F (x) is a continuous function on ( ab ,∞) and F
 a
b
 = −λ(1−β)abλ+a
< 0, limx→+∞ F (x) = +∞. Therefore, there exists at least a root
x∗5 ∈ ( ab ,∞) for F

x∗5
 = 0.
From (1) and (2), there exists a root v∗, ab < v
∗ < x1 satisfying
Eq. (43) for b > 1; there exists a root v∗, ab < v
∗ satisfying Eq. (43)
for b < 1.
Second, we consider the impact of parameters β and λ on the
consumption rate v∗. As
∂v∗(β, λ)
∂β
= λv
∗[a+ (1− b)v∗]
λ (1− β) (a+ λ)− b[a+ λ+ (1− b)v∗]2 ,
and λv∗ [a+ (1− b) v∗] > 0, we have
∂v∗(β, λ)
∂β
{λ (1− β) (a+ λ)− b[a+ λ+ (1− b)v∗]2} > 0.
Define G (v) = λ (1− β) (a+ λ)− b[a+ λ+ (1− b)v]2.
(I) If b < 1,G (v) decreases in ( ab ,∞). As vM = ab < v∗, we have
G (v∗) < G (vM), where
G (vM) = λ (1− β) (a+ λ)− b

a+ λ+ (1− b)a
b
2
< λ (1− β)

λ+ a
b

− (1− β)

λ+ a
b
2
= −a
b
(1− β)

λ+ a
b

< 0.
Weuse the feasibility condition of b > 1−β in Palacios-Huerta
and Pérez-Kakabadse (2013) for the derivation of G (vM) < 0.
G (vM) < 0 implies G (v∗) < 0.
(II) If b > 1,G (v) increases in ( ab , x1]. Thus, the maximum value
G (v) in ( ab , x1] is G(x1),G(x1) = 0. As v∗ ∈ ( ab , x1), we have
G

v∗

< 0.
From (I) and (II), when b < 1 or b > 1, we have G (v∗) < 0,
which implies ∂v
∗(β,λ)
∂β
< 0.
Using a similar method, we obtain ∂v
∗(β,λ)
∂λ
> 0.
Appendix C
Let g (s) = 1
β
( 1−e
ρ(s−T )
eρ(s−t)−eρ(s−T ) )
1
β
−1 − 1, s ≥ t , then
g (t) = 1
β
− 1 > 0, g (T ) = −1 < 0.
Thus, there exists a t∗ such that
E [c (s)] |I
E [c (s)] |M > 1 for s ∈

t, t∗

,
E [c (s)] |I
E [c (s)] |M < 1 for s ∈

t∗, T

.
Appendix D
We first prove
∂h3n+1
∂β
> 0,
∂h3n+1
∂λ
< 0, n = 0, 1, . . . ,N − 1,N .
From the expression h3n andH
3
n , n = 0, 1, . . . ,N−1,N , we have
h30 = 1, h31 = 1+ (a− b)∆,H30 = 1,H31 = 1− (1− b)∆ > 0 and
h32 = (1+ a∆)h31 − b(h31)1−
1
b − λ (1− β)
×∆2e−(λ−a)(t0−t1)(h30)1−
1
b
H30
H31
.Therefore,
∂h32
∂β
= λ∆2e−(λ−a)(t0−t1)(h30)1−
1
b
H30
H31
> 0.
As h3n+1 = h3n+ o(∆), the sign of ∂h
3
n+1
∂β
is determined by ∂h
3
n
∂β
, which
means that
∂h3n+1
∂β
> 0, n = 0, 1, . . . ,N − 1.
Using the same method, we obtain
∂h3n+1
∂λ
< 0, n = 0, 1, . . . ,
N − 1.
We then prove ∂hN (t)
∂β
> 0, ∂hN (t)
∂λ
< 0. Because
hN (t) = NT (t − tn+1) h
3
n +

1− N
T
(t − tn+1)

h3n+1,
t ∈ [tn+1, tn]
we have
∂hN (t)
∂β
= N
T
(t − tn+1) ∂h
3
n
∂β
+

1− N
T
(t − tn+1)

∂h3n+1
∂β
> 0,
∂hN (t)
∂λ
= N
T
(t − tn+1) ∂h
3
n
∂λ
+

1− N
T
(t − tn+1)

∂h3n+1
∂λ
< 0,
t ∈ [tn+1, tn], tn − tn+1 = TN .
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